AsInt, Inc. partners with Mangan Software Solutions to deliver native SAP Safety Lifecycle Manager (SLM®) Solutions

Partnership

A strategic partnership has been formed between AsInt, Inc. (AsInt) and Mangan Software Solutions (MSS). This relationship allows AsInt to deliver Mangan’s Safety Lifecycle Manager (SLM®) and subject matter expertise around Process, Functional, and Asset Safety Management as part of the SAP Master. AsInt’s Asset Integrityrelated apps will now include the business logic of Safety Lifecycle Manager (SLM®) developed by MSS to provide a single master data-driven dataset in the SAP Business Technology Platform (BTP). This approach removes data silos and points applications for the end users IT ecosystem, allowing operators to not only take advantage of cloud technologies within SAP but also, at the same time, provide a scalable enterprise approach to missioncritical data and information.

SLM® is known for providing comprehensive applications for handling the entire Safety Lifecycle end to end, covering analysis, detailed design & engineering, as well as safety performance monitoring and analytics. AsInt has established a strong presence providing Asset Integrity Apps, such as Thickness Management, Inspections, Risk Based Inspection, HCA, PHA, Etc., as native SAP Master Data-driven apps. This strategic relationship will allow
AsInt to deliver Mangan’s SLM® technology within the SAP Business Technology Platform (BTP). Combining this functionality with the core EAM (Enterprise Asset Management) capabilities of SAP will be the final step in providing a consolidated APM (Asset Performance Management) and EAM option for customers.

“MSS and AsInt are very excited to be able to introduce the discipline of Safety Lifecycle Management to the global SAP user base,” Steve Whiteside, President of Mangan Software, said. “Using MSS’s already proven SLM technology, both existing and future SAP customers will now have access to the highest standards of a process and functional safety solutions.”

Rohan Patel, Founder & CEO AsInt, Inc., stated, “By partnering with Mangan Software Solutions, AsInt can now offer a wide range of SAP customers access to Mangan’s award-winning flagship product, Safety Lifecycle Manager (SLM®), as an embedded solution and process in SAP. This is expected to enhance existing AsInt solutions and open new applications in various industries. We view Safety Lifecycle Management as an excellent addition to our growing SAP ecosystem.”

About AsInt:
AsInt is changing how people develop and deploy software for cross industries such as oil and gas, petrochemical, specialty chemical, railways, dairy, food & beverages, and Packaging. Our goal is to create a full suite of applications that meet a range of asset integrity needs regardless of your platform. But also making the software accessible via App stores and fit for purpose ease of use software. The solutions on the market today have begun to shift their focus to things like IIOT, big data, and analytics, leaving their core user base to try and implement basic workflow-supporting functionality. AsInt is renewing the focus of software on functionality and usability, committed to closing the gaps that many end users have been talking about for years. These apps
focus on resources, reduce the cost of ownership, increase availability, and ensure the safe operations of the physical asset.

About MSS:
MSS, the leading independent supplier of enterprise-wide Safety Lifecycle Management software, was named the #1 Global Supplier in the ARC Advisory Group’s 2019 Process Safety Lifecycle Management Global Market Report for its award-winning product, Safety Lifecycle Manager (SLM®). MSS’s core business is enabling their client base to digitalize the engineering disciplines of Process and Functional Safety engineering and asset integrity, leveraging the technology in its proprietary technology platform SLM. They offer a wide array of complementary solutions to support the SLM product’s implementation, hosting, and integration.

Digital Transformation of Control and Safety Systems

Digital Transformation of Control and Safety Systems

The Digital Transformation of Control and Safety Systems has come a long way. They used to be simple yet were unreliable, not very robust, or died from neglect.  In the past, the term Safety System generally wasn’t used very much, rather you would see terms such as ESD and Interlock. The technologies used in the past were often process connected switches and relays that were difficult to monitor, troubleshoot, and maintain. Field instrumentation used 3-15 psig air or 4-20 ma signals. Things have changed since then. They have become more effective yet with that, a lot more complicated as well. 

As control systems, safety systems, and field instrumentation were digitized, the amount of data a user has to specify and manage grew by orders of magnitude. Things that were defined by hardware design, that were generally unchangeable after components were specified, became functions of software and user configuration data which could be changed with relatively little effort.  This caused the management of changes, software revisions, and configuration data to become a major part of ownership. 

The problem is that the market is dominated by proprietary systems that apply only to manufacturers line of products, so the user is required to have multiple software packages to support the wide variety of instrumentation, control systems, safety systems and maintenance management support systems that exist in any of today’s process plants. Here’s an overview of the evolution and landscape of these systems and the relative chaos that still exists. 

What are industry leaders like Shell doing to digitally transform their process safety lifecycle?

Field Instrumentation 

Back in the early 1980’s an operating company was involved in the first round of process control system upgrades to the first generation of DCS that were available. There were projects for field testing prototypes of a new digital transmitter major manufacturers. The transmitters that were being tested were similar to the 4-20 ma transmitters, but the digital circuity that replaced the old analog circuitry was programmed by a bulky handheld communicator. It took about 10 parameters to set up the transmitter. 

Now you can’t buy anything other than a digital transmitter, and instead of a few parameters available, there are dozens. Digital valve controllers have also become common and the number of parameters available number in the hundreds. Device types with digital operation have also exploded, including adoption of wireless and IOT devices. The functionality and reliability of these devices far exceed those of their prior analog circuit-based relatives. The only cost is that someone has to manage all of that data. A binder full of instrument data sheets just doesn’t work anymore. 

Field Instrumentation Management Systems 

When digital field instrumentation was first introduced the only means of managing configuration data for each device was through a handheld communications device, and the configuration data resided only on the device. This was simple enough when the parameters mirrored the settings on non-smart devices. However, these devices got more sophisticated and the variety of devices available grew. Management of their configuration data became more demanding and the need for tools for management of that data became fairly obvious.

The market responded with a variety of Asset Management applications and extended functionality from basic configuration date management to include calibration and testing records and device performance monitoring.  The systems were great, but there was major problem in that each manufacturer had packages that were proprietary to their lines of instrumentation.

There have been attempts to standardize instrument Asset Management, such as the efforts of the FTD group, but to date most users have gravitated towards specific manufacturer software based upon their Enterprise or Site standard suppliers. This leaves a lot of holes when devices from other suppliers are used, especially niche devices or exceptionally complex instruments, such as analyzers are involved. Most users end up with one package for the bulk of their instrumentation and then a mix of other packages to address the outliers, or no management system for some devices. Unfortunately, manufacturers aren’t really interested in one standard. 

Communications Systems 

As digital instrumentation developed, the data available was still constrained by a single process variable transmitted over the traditional 4-20 ma circuit. The led to development of digital communications methods that would transmit considerable device operation and health data over top of, or in replacement of, the 4-20 ma PV signal. The first of these was the HART protocol developed by one manufacturer but released to the industry as an open protocol. However, other manufacturers developed their own protocols that were incompatible with HART. As with Asset Management software, the market is divided up into competing proprietary offerings and a User has to make choices on what to use.

In the 1990’s, in an attempt to standardize something, the Fieldbus Foundation was established to define interoperable protocols. Maneuvering for competitive advantage led some companies to establish their own consortiums such as Profibus and World FIP that used their own protocols. The field instrument communications world has settled on a few competing and incompatible systems. Today a user basically has to make a choice between HART, Fieldbus, Profibus and DeviceNet, and then use the appropriate, often proprietary, support software and hardware. 

Distributed Control Systems and PLC’s 

1980 is back when programming devices required customized hardware. The PLC had its own suitcase sized computer that could only be used for the PLC. Again, data was reasonably manageable, but a crude by today’s standards. 

Over the years the power of the modules has evolved from the original designs that could handle 8 functions, period, to modules that can operate all or most of a process plant. The industry came up with a new term, ICSS for Integrated. Control and Safety System to describe DCS’s that had been expanded to include PLC functions as well as Safety Instrumented Systems. 

The data involved in these systems has likewise exploded as has the tools and procedures for managing that data.  The manufacturers of the DCS, PLC and SIS systems have entire sub-businesses devoted to the management of the data associated with their systems. 

As with other systems software the available applications are usually proprietary to specific manufacturers. Packages that started out as simpler (relatively speaking) configuration management software were extended to include additional functions such as alarm management, loop turning and optimization, and varying degrees of integration with field device Asset Management Systems. 

Safety Instrumented Systems 

Safety Instrumented System logic solvers were introduced in the earl 1980’s, first as rather expensive and difficult to own stand-alone systems. The SIS’s evolved and became more economic. While there still are stand along SIS available, some of the DCS manufacturers have moved to offering Integrated Control and Safety Systems (ICSS) in which SIS hardware and software for Basic Process Control (BPCS), SIS and higher-level functions such as Historians and Advanced Control applications are offered within integrated product lines.

As with all of the other aspects of support software, the packages available for configuration and data management for SIS hardware and software is proprietary to the SIS manufacturers. 

Operation and Maintenance Systems 

The generalized Operation and Maintenance Systems that most organizations use to manage their maintenance organizations exist and have been well developed for what they do. Typically, these packages are focused on management of work orders, labor and warehouse inventory management and aren’t at all suitable for management of control and safety systems.

Most of the currently available packages started out as offerings by smaller companies but have gotten sucked up into large corporations that have focused on extending of what were plant level applications into full Enterprise Management Systems that keep the accountants and bean counters happy, but make life miserable for the line operations, maintenance and engineering personnel. I recall attending an advanced control conference in which Tom Peters (In Search of Excellence) was the keynote speaker. He had a sub-text in his presentation that he hated EMS, especially SAP. His mantra was “SAP is for saps”, which was received by much head nodding in the audience of practicing engineers. 

Some of the Operations and Maintenance Systems have attempted to add bolt on functionality, but in my view, they are all failures. As described above, the management tools for control and safety systems are fragmented and proprietary and attempting to integrate them into generalized Operation and Maintenance Systems just doesn’t work. These systems are best left to the money guys who don’t really care about control and safety systems (except when they don’t work). 

Process Safety System Data and Documentation 

The support and management software for SIS’s address only the nuts and bolts about programming and maintaining SIS hardware. They have no, or highly limited functionality for managing the overall Safety Life Cycle from initial hazard identification through testing and maintaining of protective functions such as SIFs and other Independent Protection Layers (IPLs). Some of the Operation and Maintenance System suppliers have attempted to bolt on some version of Process Safety Management functionality, but I have yet to see one that was any good. In the last decade a few engineering organizations have released various versions of software that integrate the overall Safety Lifecycle phases. The approach and quality of these packages varies. I’m biased and think that Mangan Software Solutions’ SLM package is the best of the available selections. However, The ARC Advisory Group also agrees.

Digital Transformation of Control and Safety Systems

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Conclusions  

The Digital Transformation of Control and Safety Systems has resulted in far more powerful and reliable systems than their analog and discrete component predecessors. However, the software required to support and manage these systems is balkanized mixed of separate, proprietary and incompatible software packages, each of which has a narrow scope of functionality. A typical plant user is forced to support multiple packages based upon the control and safety systems that are installed in their facilities. The selection of those systems needs to consider the support requirements for those systems, and once selected it is extremely difficult to consider alternatives as it usually requires a complete set of parallel support software which will carry its own set of plant support requirements. Typically, a facility will require a variety of applications which include: 

  • Field device support software and handheld communicators
  • Field device Asset Management Software, typically multiple packages if the User uses multiple suppliers
  • DCS/BPCS/PLC/ICSS support software for configuration, alarm management and optimization functions as used by the Site. If a Site has multiple suppliers, then multiple parallel packages are required
  • SIS support software for configuration and software management if not integrated with and ICSS software package. If a Site has multiple suppliers, then multiple parallel packages are required
  • Operations and Maintenance Management packages – selected by others and not within the control of personnel responsible for Process Control and Safety Systems.
  • Safety Lifecycle Management Software – preferably an integrated package that includes Hazard Analysis, Safety Function and System design and Safety Function testing, event data collection and performance analysis and management functions.

So choose wisely.  

Rick Stanley has over 40 years’ experience in Process Control Systems and Process Safety Systems with 32 years spent at ARCO and BP in execution of major projects, corporate standards and plant operation and maintenance. Since retiring from BP in 2011, Rick has consulted with Mangan Software Solutions (MSS) on the development and use of MSS’s SLM Safety Lifecycle Management software and has performed numerous Functional Safety Assessments for both existing and new SISs. 

Rick has a BS in Chemical Engineering from the University of California, Santa Barbara and is a registered Professional Control Systems Engineer in California and Colorado. Rick has served as a member and chairman of both the API Subcommittee for Pressure Relieving Systems and the API Subcommittee for Instrumentation and Control Systems. 

Dean Edit – Digitalization Demands An Integrated Safety Lifecycle Management System (part 1)

Dean Edit – Digitalization Demands An Integrated Safety Lifecycle Management System (part 1)

An integrated safety lifecycle management system is crucial to properly manage the entire safety lifecycle from cradle to grave. Anyone who has attempted to manage the Safety Lifecycle has quickly realized that the tools that a typical processing facility uses are wholly unsuited to meet the requirements of the Safety Lifecycle.

Most tools available are single purpose and don’t exchange or share information. The tools available are directed towards managing things such as costs, labor management, warehouse inventory management, and similar business-related functions. The systems upon which these functions are based generally use a rigid hierarchy of data relationships and have little flexibility.

An Integrated Safety Lifecycle Management program must supplement or replace the traditional tools to even be considered.  Otherwise, the result is a mix of paper files (or image files on network drives)and a variety of independent word processor and spreadsheet files.  Not to mention the procedures for data collection that fall outside of what the traditional plant management tools will do. This places an unreasonable and unsustainable burden on plant personnel. These systems may be forced to work for awhile, but don’t perform well over time.  Also, its necessary to consider changes of personnel in various positions that occur.

Safety Lifecycle Management

The Safety Lifecycle is a continuous process that originates with the conceptual design of a processing facility and continues throughout the entire service life of that process. Process Safety related functions start their life during the initital Hazard Assessments when potential hazards and their consequences are evaluated. Protective functions are designed to prevent the consequences of the hazards from occurring and their lifecycle proceeds through design, implementation and operation. As plant modifications occur, the existing functions may need to be modified,may be found to no longer be necessary, or new functions are identified as being required. This results in another trip through the lifecycle as illustrated below.

The Safety Lifecycle IEC Regulations  

 IEC 61511, defines the processes that are to be followed when developing, implementing and owning of Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS). While the scope of IEC 61511 is limited to SIS, the concepts also apply to other Protective Functions that have been identified such as Basic Process Control Functions, Interlock, Alarms or physical Protective Functions such as barriers, drainage systems, vents and other similar functions.

The Safety Lifecycle as described in IEC 61511 is shown in the figure below. This figure has been excerpted from IEC 61511 and annotated to tie the various steps with how Process Safety Work is typically executed. These major phases represent work that is often executed by separate organizations and then is passed onto the organizations responsible for the subsequent phase. 

 

Safety lifecycle management process diagram

1.) Requirements Identification

This phase involves conducting Process Hazards Analyses and identifying the Protective Functions required to avoid the consequences of process hazards from occurring.

The tools typically used for these activities are a Process Hazards Analysis application and Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA). The CCPS publication Layer of Protection Analysis: Simplified Process Risk Assessment describes the process of identification and qualification of Protective Functions, identified as Independent Protection Layers (IPL’s).

2.)  Specification, Design, Installation and Verification 

This phase is typically thought of as “Design”, but it is so much more:

  • The Specification phase is involving specification of the functional requirements for the identified IPL’s. When the IPL’s are classified as Safety Instrumented Functions (SIF), they are defined in a Safety Requirements Specification as defined by IEC 61511. Other non-SIF IPL’s are defined as described in the CCPS LOPA publication, although the concepts defined in IEC 61511 are also an excellent guide.
  • Once requirements are specified, physical design is performed. The design must conform to the functional, reliability and independence requirements that are defined in the SRS or non-SIF IPL requirements specifications.
  • The designs of the Protective Functions are installed and then are validated by inspection and functional testing. For SIS’s a Functional Safety Assessment as described by IEC 61511 is performed prior to placing the SIS into service.

3.) The Ownership Phase

This is the longest duration phase, lasting the entire life of the process operation. This phase includes:

  • Operation of the process and its Protective Functions. This includes capture of operational events such as Demands, Bypasses, Faults and Failures.
  • Periodic testing of Protective Functions at the intervals defined by the original SRS or IPL requirements. This involves documentation of test results and inclusion of those results in the periodic performance evaluations.
  • Periodic review of Protective Function performance and comparison of in-service performance with the requirements of the original SRS or IPL requirements. If performance is not meeting requirements of the original specifications, identification and implementation of corrective measures is required.
  • Management of Change in Protective Functions as process modifications occur during the process lifetime. This starts a new loop in the Safety Lifecycle where modifications, additions or deletions of Protective Functions are identified, specified and implemented.
  • Final decommissioning where the hazards associated with decommissioning are assessed and suitable Management of Change processes are applied.

 

CLICK HERE TO READ MORE ON ⇨ A Holistic Approach to the Safety Lifecycle

 

Execution Challenges

Execution of the Safety Lifecycle interacts with numerous process management tools. Some of those tools that are typically available are illustrated in the figure below. All of these tools have the characteristics that they are generally suitable for the single purposes for which they were chosen, but all of them have limitations that make them unsuitable for use with a Safety Lifecycle Management process.

The Safety Lifecycle involves numerous complex relationships that cross traditional organizational boundaries and require sharing of data across these boundaries. The tools traditionally used in process operational management just don’t fit the requirements of Managing the Safety Lifecycle. Attempts to force fit them to Safety Lifecycle Management results in fragmented information that is difficult to access and maintain or which is just missing, and which results in excessive costs and highly ineffective Safety Lifecycle Management. The work around become so fragmented and complex, they rapidly become unsustainable. 

SRS and SIS engineer data
  • The Value of an Integrated Safety Lifecycle Management System

    An Integrated Safety Lifecycle Management System provides the benefits that an organization expects from the protective systems installed in a facility. The System provides fit for purpose work processes that account for the multiple relationships among the various parts of the Safety Lifecycle that traditional tools do not provide. A few of the high-level benefits are:

        • Consistency and quality of data is vastly improved by using common processes, data selection lists, data requirements and procedures that have been thought out and optimized for the needs of managing protective systems.
        • Design of Protective Functions is made much more efficient due to standardization of the information needed and the ability to copy SRS and non-SIF IPL data from similar applications that exist elsewhere in an organization. Design data is readily available to all authorized Users that need that data.
        • Process Safety awareness is enhanced because the Safety Lifecycle Management System provides links between the originating hazard assessments, PHA Scenarios, LOPA’s, LOPA IPL’s and the Plant Assets used to implement the Protective Functions. Authorized users can readily identify Protective Functions and Plant Assets that implement them, and directly access the process hazards for which the functions were installed to prevent.
        • Protective Function and associated Plant Asset performance events can be readily captured with a minimum of effort. The Safety Lifecycle Management System collects all of the event data and automatically produces performance data such as Tests Overdue, Tests, Failure Rates, Tests Upcoming, Demand Rates, Failure Rates and Prior Use statistics on a real time basis. The performance can be reported on a Unit, Site or Enterprise basis and can be categorized by Protective Function type, Device Type, Device manufacturer or similar categories. This allows Users to fully understand the conformance of Protective Function and Device performance relative to their Safety Requirements and identify any performance issues.

     

 Rick Stanley has over 45 years’ experience in Process Control Systems and Process Safety Systems with 32 years spent at ARCO and BP in execution of major projects, corporate standards and plant operation and maintenance. Since retiring from BP Rick has consulted with Mangan Software Solutions (MSS) on the development and use of MSS’s SLM Safety Lifecycle Management software and has performed numerous Functional Safety Assessments for both existing and new SISs.

Rick has a BS in Chemical Engineering from the University of California, Santa Barbara where he majored in beach and minored in Chemical Engineering… and has the grade point to prove it. He is a registered Professional Control Systems Engineer in California and Colorado. Rick has served as a member and chairman of both the API Subcommittee for Pressure Relieving Systems and the API Subcommittee for Instrumentation and Control Systems.

See how industry leaders like Shell are digitizing their process safety lifecycle!

A Holistic Approach to the Safety Lifecycle

A Holistic Approach to the Safety Lifecycle

Holistic Approach to the Safety Life Cycle

Holistic (adj): relating to or concerned with wholes or with complete systems rather than with the analysis of, treatment of, or dissection into parts.

A lot of factors enter into how a Process Safety Culture develops in an organization, but the net result is that either an organization has a positive, effective Safety Life Cycle culture or becomes exposed to major incidents that can cause a business to fail. The history of major incidents in process plants is littered with root causes related to failed Safety Cultures.

A robust Process Safety Management culture in a facility also leads to multiple other improvements. In an operation where Process Safety has a major focus, operators tend to be more attentive to keeping their units stable and on spec and the entire organization tends to be more focused on quality of work. If there is a lax Process Safety Culture, then it is easy for operations to become sloppy and for other groups to just let things slide.

When I stand back a bit and think of what factors determine whether a facility has an effective Safety Culture, the following come to mind. All of these are complex subjects, so only a bit is discussed. However, the combined effect of these items has deep impacts upon whether a Process Safety Culture is positive or toxic. In the end however, people do the work for which they are rewarded, even if it’s just a positive performance review. If Process Safety performance is not a key item on the expectations for an employee’s performance, its probably not going to be something that gets a lot of effort. 

Management Attitude

Unfortunately, the number one factor in determining how successful a Process Safety Culture becomes, is the attitude of the management of an Enterprise or Site. I’ve had the fortune and mis-fortune to work in environments where the management had some level of appreciation of Process Safety and work in environments where Process Safety came right after cost, schedule and getting my next promotion (and I hope I get out of here before something goes wrong).

A successful Process Safety Culture, and the Process Safety Management structure that evolves from it, starts at the top. In order to have an effective system, the management of an organization has to demonstrate that Process Safety is as important as the quarterly results. Management has to continue to reinforce that commitment. A basic philosophy has to be defined and spread through the organization, and the expectations of that philosophy need to be rigorously applied at all levels of management and supervision. Failure to meet those expectations has to have real consequences.

Management has to demonstrate a basic knowledge of, and high and continuous interest in the Process Safety Management System. The status of Process Safety needs to be as high on the priority list as more measurable things like production results and costs. Plant staff needs to understand that missing key performance targets for Process Safety functions such as periodic testing, having too many demands or tolerating poor safety function performance have the same consequences as other financially related shortfalls. If management isn’t actively following the Process Safety Life Cycle, they are really telling their staff that they don’t care, and the staff is going to let things slide to pursue things that they think that management cares about.

The systems also have to be robust enough that they become embedded in the organization’s operating culture so that it can survive the changes in personnel, including management, that always happen. Personnel need to have clearly defined responsibilities and be trained to meet those responsibilities. When an individual takes on a new position, the Process Safety responsibilities and procedures need to be part of the transition process. It’s tough to build a Process Safety Culture, but it’s fairly easy to destroy one. When the first question out of manager’s mouth is what does it cost? Or why are you doing that? it’s a good sign that the Process Safety Culture isn’t doing very well.

Information Availability and Training

Part of implementing a robust Process Safety Management System is making sure that all of the personnel that are expected to perform tasks related to the system are fully trained and have access to the information they need. This extends far beyond just the mechanics of performing their assigned tasks.

The training they receive needs to include a clear identification of how their tasks fit in with the Safety Life Cycle Management System, and full training in the underlying process hazards and access to usable reference data. Training needs to be routinely reinforced. Refresher training should be routine and training on changes to Process Safety Systems should be an integral part of the Management of Change procedures. As noted above, Process Safety requirements and procedures need to be part of all transition plans.

Operations personnel in particular require comprehensive initial training and periodic refresher training. Operations personnel need to be fully aware of the protective functions that are installed in their units, what process hazards are responsible for their installation, and how they are operated. Operations supervision needs to take an active role in making sure that this knowledge is current, and operators are routinely drilled in the properly responses to process safety related events.  Procedures for collection of event data for demands, failures, bypasses and similar events need to be reinforced and accurately captured.

Procedures

Written procedures need to be prepared and maintained for Process Safety related activities. This includes validation and periodic testing procedures, operating procedures and procedures for capture and transmittal of Process Safety related events such as Demands, Tests, Failures and Bypasses. These procedures need to be readily available to all individuals whose jobs involve Process Safety, which means just about everybody.

Personal Experience and Biases

Everyone who is part of the Safety Life Cycle comes to the process with their own experiences and biases. The most general categorization is those who have experienced a major incident and those who have not. The members of the those that have group seldom need to be convinced of the need to have a robust and effective Safety Life Cycle Management process.

The those who have not group often are the most difficult to bring into compliance as they often do not recognize the critical value that the process has. This is an especially difficult problem if the members of management at the higher levels believe that “it can’t happen here”. Unfortunately, these folks get multiple opportunities to join the “those that have” group and its just a matter of how severe their lesson is. Trevor Kletz’s books, What Went Wrong, and Still Going Wrong should be mandatory reading for those folks. They need to be convinced that it can happen to them.

Silos, Tribes and Conflict

Every process facility is organized into various departments and work groups. Over time the divisions between these departments and work groups can become tribal with each group working in their own silo and not sharing information. Information becomes power and often isn’t readily shared.

Process Safety Information is unfortunately one class of information that is far too closely held. This is partially due to the isolated nature of the common process hazards analysis software packages, but in some places, especially those with poor Process Safety Cultures, process hazard data is almost treated as a state secret. I recall on multiple occasions attempting to get copies of HAZOP data from a Process Safety Group and getting the equivalent of “who wants to know” before I could force release of the data. Not a healthy environment. Process Safety information was distributed to operations and maintenance personnel in heavily curated forms and very few people had access to the actual HAZOP data.

The same thing can happen between operations, engineering and maintenance groups. They end up performing day to day work in a vacuum and data sharing is determined only by what is available on the common operation and maintenance tools that are available. It isn’t always intentional, that’s just the way the work processes end up dividing people.

Process Safety Management Systems require a lot of data sharing and organizational barriers need to be broken down, or at least partially broken down. In a robust Process Safety Culture, these barriers are not as firm and you see a lot more data sharing that can be observed in organizations that don’t have a good Process Safety Culture.

See how industry leaders like Shell are digitizing their process safety lifecycle!

System Capabilities, Limitations and Performance

I’ve long had a private theory that the operating culture in a plant is set by the design, capabilities and failures of the plant’s process control systems. It’s not that personnel set out to make it that way, but over time people adapt their behavior to match what the process control system allows them to do or what the system’s performance and reliability imposes upon them in forced work around or other less than optimum practices. Everything an operator sees on a daily basis is viewed through the lens of the information provided by the process control system and that shapes a lot of culture. This ends up affecting how other organizations behave, as in most facilities operations is king no matter what the organization chart says.

In the same manner, the presence or lack of presence of Process Safety Systems and the importance that the plant management and supervision place on those systems shapes a plant’s process safety culture and determines how effective these systems are. This determines whether they become the assets that were intended to be or become perceived as an obstacle to operations

Poorly designed systems may fail to provide the protection with which they have been credited. Even worse, poorly designed systems result in loss of credibility with the staff that have to work with them. Operators will not tolerate a system that causes false trips, operating difficulty or is just too hard to understand. Before long the systems are disabled, and nobody asks why.

I’ve seen lots of skepticism, some well-earned, from operators when a new safety system was installed. Often, they get handed a system designed by a contractor that had little guidance other than a Project Engineer beating them up for cost and schedule. Upon the first operational difficulties, the criticism starts. In an organization that has a poor Safety Life Cycle management system, the criticism is often just accepted, and management starts hearing the complaints and decides that the safety systems don’t really have much value.

The first requirement is that the design all Safety Related functions get adequate direction and review from qualified engineering staff who are skilled in design for reliability and design of human interfaces and understand how the plant operators view things. When performance issues do occur, the design needs to be looked at to determine where the problem occurred. In some cases, it’s a learning experience as prior poor operating practices may have caused the operators to be careless and allowed the process to go where it should not have gone. In other cases, the protective system operated exactly as it should have, and the operators don’t initially appreciate the bullet they dodged.

Well-designed systems can have the opposite effect. Engineering and Process Safety personnel need to take the performance of the installed protective systems very seriously. These are not install-and-forget systems. Operations often needs considerable hand holding for quite a while after commissioning. This involves continued contact with operations personnel about their experiences and seriously listening to their feedback. Sometimes there are explanations, clarifications and follow up training, but just as often there is something that needs to be fixed.  All trips that occur need to be investigated to determine if a trip was valid and then operations needs to be brought into the loop on the findings. 

Sometimes they just have to learn by being saved by a process safety system. I recall installing a rather complex protective system on an FCCU. The operators were very afraid of the system (first question during training – How do I turn it off? Answer – You don’t. Second question What do I do if it trips – Answer – Secure the unit, calm down and then start the restart procedure). It took a lot of convincing to get them to turn on the system and more than a few questions over time about what it really would do.

You could tell it was always on their mind as I seldom could walk through the control room without someone having a question or complaint, but I did make it a point to wander by fairly regularly and start a conversation before I got hijacked. One day they had an equipment failure that resulted in the system tripping the unit. First response was that it was the trip system that caused it. After a couple of days of the investigation, one operator realized that it really was a valid trip, and it saved them from a lot of equipment damage and people getting hurt. The operator passed on his epiphany to others on his crew. The questions stopped and there wasn’t any more grumbling. I knew we had broken through when the operators were reminding each other about putting the system into service before they started back up.

A lot of factors affect how a Process Safety Culture develops in an organization. 

 Rick Stanley has over 45 years’ experience in Process Control Systems and Process Safety Systems with 32 years spent at ARCO and BP in execution of major projects, corporate standards and plant operation and maintenance. Since retiring from BP Rick has consulted with Mangan Software Solutions (MSS) on the development and use of MSS’s SLM Safety Lifecycle Management software and has performed numerous Functional Safety Assessments for both existing and new SISs.

Rick has a BS in Chemical Engineering from the University of California, Santa Barbara where he majored in beach and minored in Chemical Engineering… and has the grade point to prove it. He is a registered Professional Control Systems Engineer in California and Colorado. Rick has served as a member and chairman of both the API Subcommittee for Pressure Relieving Systems and the API Subcommittee for Instrumentation and Control Systems.

Digital Transformation of Control and Safety Systems – Retired

Digital Transformation of Control and Safety Systems – Retired

The Digital Transformation of Control and Safety Systems has come a long way. They used to be simple yet were unreliable, not very robust, or died from neglect.  In the past, the term Safety System generally wasn’t used very much, rather you would see terms such as ESD and Interlock. The technologies used in the past were often process connected switches and relays that were difficult to monitor, troubleshoot, and maintain. Field instrumentation used 3-15 psig air or 4-20 ma signals. Things have changed since then. They have become more effective yet with that, a lot more complicated as well. 

The Digital Transformation of Control and Safety Systems has come a long way. They used to be simple yet were unreliable, not very robust, or died from neglect.  In the past, the term Safety System generally wasn’t used very much, rather you would see terms such as ESD and Interlock. The technologies used in the past were often process connected switches and relays that were difficult to monitor, troubleshoot, and maintain. Field instrumentation used 3-15 psig air or 4-20 ma signals. Things have changed since then. They have become more effective yet with that, a lot more complicated as well. 

As control systems, safety systems, and field instrumentation were digitized, the amount of data a user has to specify and manage grew by orders of magnitude. Things that were defined by hardware design, that were generally unchangeable after components were specified, became functions of software and user configuration data which could be changed with relatively little effort.  This caused the management of changes, software revisions, and configuration data to become a major part of ownership. 

The problem is that the market is dominated by proprietary systems that apply only to manufacturers line of products, so the user is required to have multiple software packages to support the wide variety of instrumentation, control systems, safety systems and maintenance management support systems that exist in any of today’s process plants. Here’s an overview of the evolution and landscape of these systems and the relative chaos that still exists. 

What are industry leaders like Shell doing to digitally transform their process safety lifecycle?

Process Plant Control and Safety System Software Overview

 

 Field Instrumentation 

Back in the early 1980’s an operating company was involved in the first round of process control system upgrades to the first generation of DCS that were available. There were projects for field testing prototypes of a new digital transmitter major manufacturers. The transmitters that were being tested were similar to the 4-20 ma transmitters, but the digital circuity that replaced the old analog circuitry was programmed by a bulky handheld communicator. It took about 10 parameters to set up the transmitter. 

Now you can’t buy anything other than a digital transmitter, and instead of a few parameters available, there are dozens. Digital valve controllers have also become common and the number of parameters available number in the hundreds. Device types with digital operation have also exploded, including adoption of wireless and IOT devices. The functionality and reliability of these devices far exceed those of their prior analog circuit-based relatives. The only cost is that someone has to manage all of that data. A binder full of instrument data sheets just doesn’t work anymore. 

Field Instrumentation Management Systems 

When digital field instrumentation was first introduced the only means of managing configuration data for each device was through a handheld communications device, and the configuration data resided only on the device. This was simple enough when the parameters mirrored the settings on non-smart devices. However, these devices got more sophisticated and the variety of devices available grew. Management of their configuration data became more demanding and the need for tools for management of that data became fairly obvious.

The market responded with a variety of Asset Management applications and extended functionality from basic configuration date management to include calibration and testing records and device performance monitoring.  The systems were great, but there was major problem in that each manufacturer had packages that were proprietary to their lines of instrumentation.

There have been attempts to standardize instrument Asset Management, such as the efforts of the FTD group, but to date most users have gravitated towards specific manufacturer software based upon their Enterprise or Site standard suppliers. This leaves a lot of holes when devices from other suppliers are used, especially niche devices or exceptionally complex instruments, such as analyzers are involved. Most users end up with one package for the bulk of their instrumentation and then a mix of other packages to address the outliers, or no management system for some devices. Unfortunately, manufacturers aren’t really interested in one standard. 

Communications Systems 

As digital instrumentation developed, the data available was still constrained by a single process variable transmitted over the traditional 4-20 ma circuit. The led to development of digital communications methods that would transmit considerable device operation and health data over top of, or in replacement of, the 4-20 ma PV signal. The first of these was the HART protocol developed by one manufacturer but released to the industry as an open protocol. However, other manufacturers developed their own protocols that were incompatible with HART. As with Asset Management software, the market is divided up into competing proprietary offerings and a User has to make choices on what to use.

 In the 1990’s, in an attempt to standardize something, the Fieldbus Foundation was established to define interoperable protocols. Maneuvering for competitive advantage led some companies to establish their own consortiums such as Profibus and World FIP that used their own protocols. The field instrument communications world has settled on a few competing and incompatible systems. Today a user basically has to make a choice between HART, Fieldbus, Profibus and DeviceNet, and then use the appropriate, often proprietary, support software and hardware. 

Distributed Control Systems and PLC’s 

1980 is back when programming devices required customized hardware. The PLC had its own suitcase sized computer that could only be used for the PLC. Again, data was reasonably manageable, but a crude by today’s standards. 

Over the years the power of the modules has evolved from the original designs that could handle 8 functions, period, to modules that can operate all or most of a process plant. The industry came up with a new term, ICSS for Integrated. Control and Safety System to describe DCS’s that had been expanded to include PLC functions as well as Safety Instrumented Systems. 

The data involved in these systems has likewise exploded as has the tools and procedures for managing that data.  The manufacturers of the DCS, PLC and SIS systems have entire sub-businesses devoted to the management of the data associated with their systems. 

As with other systems software the available applications are usually proprietary to specific manufacturers. Packages that started out as simpler (relatively speaking) configuration management software were extended to include additional functions such as alarm management, loop turning and optimization, and varying degrees of integration with field device Asset Management Systems. 

Safety Instrumented Systems 

Safety Instrumented System logic solvers were introduced in the earl 1980’s, first as rather expensive and difficult to own stand-alone systems. The SIS’s evolved and became more economic. While there still are stand along SIS available, some of the DCS manufacturers have moved to offering Integrated Control and Safety Systems (ICSS) in which SIS hardware and software for Basic Process Control (BPCS), SIS and higher-level functions such as Historians and Advanced Control applications are offered within integrated product lines.

 As with all of the other aspects of support software, the packages available for configuration and data management for SIS hardware and software is proprietary to the SIS manufacturers. 

Operation and Maintenance Systems 

The generalized Operation and Maintenance Systems that most organizations use to manage their maintenance organizations exist and have been well developed for what they do. Typically, these packages are focused on management of work orders, labor and warehouse inventory management and aren’t at all suitable for management of control and safety systems.

 Most of the currently available packages started out as offerings by smaller companies but have gotten sucked up into large corporations that have focused on extending of what were plant level applications into full Enterprise Management Systems that keep the accountants and bean counters happy, but make life miserable for the line operations, maintenance and engineering personnel. I recall attending an advanced control conference in which Tom Peters (In Search of Excellence) was the keynote speaker. He had a sub-text in his presentation that he hated EMS, especially SAP. His mantra was “SAP is for saps”, which was received by much head nodding in the audience of practicing engineers. 

Some of the Operations and Maintenance Systems have attempted to add bolt on functionality, but in my view, they are all failures. As described above, the management tools for control and safety systems are fragmented and proprietary and attempting to integrate them into generalized Operation and Maintenance Systems just doesn’t work. These systems are best left to the money guys who don’t really care about control and safety systems (except when they don’t work). 

Process Safety System Data and Documentation 

The support and management software for SIS’s address only the nuts and bolts about programming and maintaining SIS hardware. They have no, or highly limited functionality for managing the overall Safety Life Cycle from initial hazard identification through testing and maintaining of protective functions such as SIFs and other Independent Protection Layers (IPLs). Some of the Operation and Maintenance System suppliers have attempted to bolt on some version of Process Safety Management functionality, but I have yet to see one that was any good. In the last decade a few engineering organizations have released various versions of software that integrate the overall Safety Lifecycle phases. The approach and quality of these packages varies. I’m biased and think that Mangan Software Solutions’ SLM package is the best of the available selections. However, The ARC Advisory Group also agrees.

 Digital Transformation of Control and Safety Systems

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 Conclusions  

The Digital Transformation of Control and Safety Systems has resulted in far more powerful and reliable systems than their analog and discrete component predecessors. However, the software required to support and manage these systems is balkanized mixed of separate, proprietary and incompatible software packages, each of which has a narrow scope of functionality. A typical plant user is forced to support multiple packages based upon the control and safety systems that are installed in their facilities. The selection of those systems needs to consider the support requirements for those systems, and once selected it is extremely difficult to consider alternatives as it usually requires a complete set of parallel support software which will carry its own set of plant support requirements. Typically, a facility will require a variety of applications which include: 

  • Field device support software and handheld communicators
  • Field device Asset Management Software, typically multiple packages if the User uses multiple suppliers
  • DCS/BPCS/PLC/ICSS support software for configuration, alarm management and optimization functions as used by the Site. If a Site has multiple suppliers, then multiple parallel packages are required
  • SIS support software for configuration and software management if not integrated with and ICSS software package. If a Site has multiple suppliers, then multiple parallel packages are required
  • Operations and Maintenance Management packages – selected by others and not within the control of personnel responsible for Process Control and Safety Systems.
  • Safety Lifecycle Management Software – preferably an integrated package that includes Hazard Analysis, Safety Function and System design and Safety Function testing, event data collection and performance analysis and management functions.

 So choose wisely.  

Rick Stanley has over 40 years’ experience in Process Control Systems and Process Safety Systems with 32 years spent at ARCO and BP in execution of major projects, corporate standards and plant operation and maintenance. Since retiring from BP in 2011, Rick has consulted with Mangan Software Solutions (MSS) on the development and use of MSS’s SLM Safety Lifecycle Management software and has performed numerous Functional Safety Assessments for both existing and new SISs. 

Rick has a BS in Chemical Engineering from the University of California, Santa Barbara and is a registered Professional Control Systems Engineer in California and Colorado. Rick has served as a member and chairman of both the API Subcommittee for Pressure Relieving Systems and the API Subcommittee for Instrumentation and Control Systems. 

Mangan Software Solutions and HIMA Announce Global Partnership

We are excited to announce our global partnership with HIMA Paul Hildebrandt GmbH! The partnership aims to provide award winning technology and solutions to a globally renowned installed base with the market’s only TÜV Rhineland certified comprehensive safety management solution in accordance with international Functional Safety standards IEC-61511 and IEC-61508.

“The unique combination of Mangan Software Solutions’ industry leading technology and HIMA Paul Hildebrandt GmbH’s 110 years of globally recognized safety innovation, will enable clients to reach the next level of sustainable safety performance, enabling them to transition from thinking they are safe to knowing they are safe.” – Ronak Patel

“We are especially privileged to partner with MSS, whose digitalization solution closes the loop on managing the safety lifecycle. Our customers will now have the data to prove that they are reducing risk by the appropriate amount for the minimum capital and operating costs, and will be provided with actionable insights to optimize how they manage functional safety within their process. I am confident that, through this partnership, HIMA and MSS’ collaboration will help to optimize the safety of the process industry worldwide, both within HIMA’s installed base and for our new customers” says Jörg de la Motte, CEO at HIMA.

Process Safety and Functional Safety is more than just hardware, software, testing and metrics. Taking an overall approach and instilling a culture of safety requires a complete end-to-end system. This includes digitalized lifecycle management, from initial hazard analysis through operations & maintenance to final decommissioning.

Powered by the Safety Lifecycle Manager, HIMA is offering a holistic digitalized safety management solution. Safety related data, generated by all stages of the functional safety lifecycle, by disparate systems, is collated in one, relational platform. This facilitates the customer the ability to optimize safety performance across a plant, complete facility, or enterprise, as well as being able to demonstrate auditable, continuous compliance with the relevant standards for functional safety.

This new solution will address customer needs and concerns by providing key performance indicators and reports, giving unprecedented visibility and assurance that the process risk controls are being effectively managed before an incident occurs.

“The combined team of HIMA experts and the best-in-class SLM® platform will transform the Process Safety and Functional Safety market,” said Steve Whiteside, President of MSS. “We are proud to be a key component of HIMA’s Lifecycle Services and the Lifecycle Management Solution, which will form the foundation of digitalization safety related strategies for many organizations around the world.”

Source: www.hydrocarbonprocessing.com

ABOUT Mangan Software Solutions: MSS is a wholly owned subsidiary of Mangan, Inc. that leverages technology and software services to standardize and automate business processes for the energy industry. Headquartered in Houston, with offices in Atlanta and London, MSS’ engineers and developers are experts in the fields of Safety Lifecycle Management and Safety Instrumented Systems and deploy their industry best practice flagship SLM platform suite to industries that require reliable high-performance automation solutions.

Safety Lifecycle Manager (SLM®) Product Brochure

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SLM v2 Enterprise Platform provides the solution for your Process Safety and Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) Lifecycle Management requirements. Our comprehensive software uses the SLM core system and modularizes all of your compliance processes and engineering practices; allowing you to customize your solution. Its easily configurable interface and workflows ensure that SLM is in alignment with your standards and practices, and not vice-versa.

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SLM Module Overview

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The Single Software Solution for All Process Safety and SIS Lifecycle Management

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SLM Product Sheet

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The culmination of decades of engineering experience, SLM’s comprehensive software platform is the only solution to manage both Process Safety and the SIS lifecycle. Our technology breaks down the silo culture and unifies your organization around a single source of truth.

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